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WHAT'S IN A NAME? THE WORRISOME
INTERCHANGE OF JUVENILE
"ADJUDICATIONS" WITH CRIMINAL
"CONVICTIONS"
Abstract: Juvenile delinquency adjudications are increasingly considered
to be criminal convictions for purposes of sentencing enhancement in
subsequent adult proceedings, leading to a renewed call for extension of
the right to jury trial in the juvenile court so as to legitimize the use of ad-
judications. Such an extension is troubling, however, because regardless
of the factfinder, it is improper to equate juvenile delinquency adjudica-
tions with criminal convictions for several reasons. First, the juvenile court
remains distinct from the criminal court in its purpose and procedure.
Second, the prevalence of juvenile pleas raises questions about whether
juveniles defend against delinquency charges with the same vigor as they
would against criminal charges. Finally, the necessity for a system of trans-
fer into adult criminal court is questionable if adjudications can ex post
facto be considered convictions. Although fairness dictates that juvenile
adjudications should not be considered convictions, if they are consis-
tently used as such, the infancy defense should be available in the juvenile
court.
INTRODUCTION
In 2000, in Ap/irendi u New Jersey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,'
and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, 2 re-
quired any fact that increased the penalty for a crime beyond the pre-
scribed statutory maximum, other than that of a prior conviction, be
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 In carving
U.S. Corns r. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
2 Id. amend. VI.
3 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The Court noted that its holding was foreshadowed by its
1999 opinion in Jones v. United States, where it stated that under the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment,
any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictmenttand proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at
476; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). In Jones, the Court distinguished
prior convictions from other factors requiring presentation to the jury, noting that prior
495
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out an exception for prior convictions, the Court noted that a court
could accept the validity of a prior conviction because the defendant
had a right to a jury trial, and the prosecutor proved the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 It is unclear if this exception for
prior convictions encompasses juvenile court delinquency adjudica-
tions because in holding that prior convictions are sufficiently reliable,
the Court relied on the availability of the jury trial for the predecessor
offense and, unlike in criminal court, there is no constitutional right to
a jury trial in juvenile court. 5
Due to this uncertainty, there is a split among the federal circuits
as to whether delinquency adjudications can properly be considered
convictions under Apprendi. 6 The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third,
Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, and some state courts, have held
that it is proper to consider adjudications to be convictions for Apprendi
purposes if the juvenile was afforded all of the due process to which he
or she was constitutionally entitled.' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit and some state courts have held that a juvenile delin-
convictions must have been established through procedures which satisfied the guarantees
of lair notice, reasonable doubt, and the jury trial. 526 U.S. at 249.
4 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496. The Court noted the difference in legitimacy between a
situation where there is presentment of evidence to a jury under a standard of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt and one where a judge might find guilt under &lesser standard of
proof. Id. The presence of a jury thus gives legitimacy to a finding of guilt. See id.
The Court subsequently affirmed Apprendi and, specifically, the significant role of the
jury in sentencing. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005) (reaffirming the
holding in Apprendi that any tact other than a prior conviction must be proven to the jury,
noting that the fairness and reliability guaranteed by the right to jury trial outweighed any
interest in speedy trials); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305-06 (2004) (holding that
under the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, a judge's enhancement of sentence beyond
the standard maximum based on determination that defendant acted with deliberate cru-
elty was unconstitutional and noting that the rule in Apprendi gives meaning to the right to
jury trial, which is more than a mere procedural formality); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,
589 (2002) (holding that a judge could not impose the death penalty based solely on judi-
cial factfinding because capital defendants, like the noncapital defendant in Apprendi, are
entitled to a jury determination of any fact that increases their maximum punishment).
3 McKeiver V. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion). In its hold-
ing, the Court did not address the constitutional differences between adult convictions
and juvenile delinquency adjudications, specifically what significance the lack of a right to
jury trial in most juvenile courts might have in considering adjudications as convictions for
the purpose of subsequent sentence enhancement beyond the statutory maximum, See
United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187, 1193 (9th Cir. 2001).
6 See infra 130-156 and accompanying text.
7 United States V. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Burge,
407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir.
2003); United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002); State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d
732, 740 (Kan. 2002); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 615 (Minn. 2006); State v. Weber,
112 P.3d 1287, 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
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quency adjudication cannot be considered a conviction if the juvenile
did not have the right to trial by jury because such an adjudication
lacks the procedural soundness of a criminal conviction. 8 Finally, the
U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and Seventh Circuits have noted
that the use of a juvenile delinquency adjudication as a criminal convic-
tion is presumptively proper where there is a state right to jury trial in
juvenile court, without further addressing the broader substantive issue
of whether the adjudications at issue would be sufficiently reliable to be
considered convictions if there had not been a state right to trial by jury
at the juvenile delinquency adjudication . 9
In response to the use of juvenile adjudications as criminal con-
victions for purposes of sentence enhancements beyond the statutory
maximum, there has been a renewed call for an extension of the right
to trial by jury in the juvenile court. 10 A right to trial by jury is seen as .
a means to ensure the integrity of a juvenile adjudication in light of its
potential use as a criminal conviction in a subsequent sentence en-
hancement."
Part I of this Note traces the development of the juvenile court, its
goal of rehabilitation, and its designation as a noncriminal court." Part
II discusses the increased blurring of the juvenile and criminal courts,
and presents new questions about the use of juvenile court adjudica-
tions following the Supreme Court's holding in Apprendi. 13 Part III re-
3 Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194-95; Pinkston v. State, 836 N.E.2d 453, 463 (Ind. Ct. App.
2005); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1288 (La. 2004); State v. Chatman, No. M2003-
00806-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 901138, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2005).
9 United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v.
Wilburn, 473 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2007) (recognizing the split among the circuits but
noting that the court need not take a position on the split because the defendant had a
right to jury trial at his delinquency adjudication under Wisconsin law). In United States u
Matthews the First Circuit similarly noted that it need not decide whether the availability of
trial by jury was necessary to assure reliability for Apprendi purposes because the defendant
had a right to trial by jury in his juvenile court proceeding tinder Massachusetts law and so.
his adjudication presumptively qualified as a conviction. Matthews, 498 F.3d at 35-36. The
court noted that the primary concern in determining whether adjudications should prop-
erly be considered convictions for Apprendi purposes should be with the reliability of the
adjudication and where the adjudication is reliable, it should not be distinguished from a
criminal conviction, but because defendant had a right to trial by jury as a juvenile, it need
not determine whether the availability of a right to trial by jury was necessary to determin-
ing reliability. Id.
10 See generally Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver:
Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile
Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1111 (2003).
11 See id, at 1224.
12 See infra notes 18-73 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 74-156 and accompanying text.
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sponds to the renewed call for the tight to trial by jury in juvenile court
for the purpose of assuring the accuracy of juvenile delinquencies given
their potential consideration as criminal convictions." This Note ar-
gues that it is improper to treat juvenile delinquency adjudications as
equivalent to criminal convictions in enhancing a subsequent adult
sentence because the juvenile court is not a criminal court, and so ju-
veniles may not be motivated to defend against a delinquency charge as
vigorously as they would against a criminal charge. 18 Further, such use
undermines the necessity for a system of transfer of juveniles to adult
court for the purpose of facing criminal penalties. 16 Finally, this Note
argues that if juvenile delinquency adjudications are to be considered
equivalent to criminal convictions, the infancy defense should be avail-
able in the juvenile court. 17
I. THE EARLY JUVENILE COURT AND THE AMBITIOUS GOAL OF
REHABILITATION
A. The Establishment of the Juvenile Court
The juvenile court was established in 1899 with the idea that chil-
dren are neither innately prone to criminal behavior nor do they choose
to act as criminals. 18 Instead, the belief was that the criminality of chil-
dren was determined by extrinsic forces beyond their control, such as
poverty and parental neglect, and children therefore should not be held
to the same standard of criminal liability as adults. 19
Prior to the progressive reforms of the late nineteenth century that
led to the first juvenile court, children were tried in adult criminal
court.20 The availability of the common law infancy defense served as
the only protection for juveniles charged with crimes. 21 This defense
presumed that children younger than seven lacked criminal capacity,
children aged fourteen and older were fully responsible for their crimi-
nal actions, and children between seven and fourteen lacked criminal
14 See infra notes 157-229 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 175-210 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 211-221 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 222-229 and accompanying text.
18 See Feld, supra note 10, at 1137.
19 See id.
20 BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
47 (1999).
21 Id.
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capacity, although this last presumption was rebuttable. 22 As the recog-
nition of adolescence as a stage of development distinct from child-
hood and adulthood became more prevalent, progressive reformers
pushed for the creation of distinct courts for adolescents where juve-
niles could avoid the harshness of adult sentencing while still facing
some legal control.23 These progressive reforms culminated in 1899
with the creation of the nation's first juvenile court in Cook County,
Illinois.24 By the early twentieth century, nearly every state had estab-
lished a juvenile justice system distinct from the adult criminal court. 25
Guided by the doctrine of parens patriae, 26 the juvenile court as-
sumed a benevolent role in the lives of misguided youths." Juveniles
who committed crimes were not viewed as acting of their own free will
but rather were considered victims of their environment. 28 Rather than
focus on the nature of the offense with a goal of punishment, the juve-
nile court focused on the needs of the offender with a goal of rehabili-
tation.29 The juvenile court was a civil court, which allowed for flexibil-
ity in treatment and assistance to children instead of punishment." The
objective of the juvenile court was to rehabilitate the child and protect
society rather than to adjudge guilt, and the state was to act as parens
patriae rather than as prosecuting attorney. 31
22 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,16-17 (1967) (tracing the historical development of the
juvenile court).
23 FELD, supra note 20, at 48.
24 Id, at 55.
25 HOWARD M. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006
NATIONAL REPORT 94 (2006), available at http://ojjdp.ncjrs.org/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/
chapter4.pdf.
26 Under the doctrine of parens patriae, the state acts as the provider of protection for
those unable to protect themselves. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004).
27 FFT,D, supra note 20, at 62.
28 Id. ('The social construction of childhood characterized children as innocent and
free from vice, responsible neither for acting out their innate biological imperatives nor
for failing to develop into responsible adults.").
29 Id.
5° Id. at 63 ("Progressives regarded the interests of young people and society as con-
gruent; intervention to aid the child served the 'best interests' of both the youth and the
community. As a result, juvenile courts' architects envisioned the juvenile court as a wel-
fare system rather than just a children's criminal court."). The Supreme Court noted in
1966, in Kent v. United States, that the juvenile court considered the child's needs instead of
punishment for his or her criminal conduct. 383 U.S. 541,554 (1966).
51 FELD, supra note 20, at 62. In 1967, in In re Gault, the Supreme Court distinguished
the rehabilitative purpose of the juvenile court from the criminal court, noting that chil-
dren were to be treated, not punished, and the justification for any procedures against the
child, from arrest to confinement, was to be clinical, not punitive. 387 U.S. at 15-16.
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In characterizing itself as civil, the juvenile court rejected much of
the terminology, procedure, and substance of the adult criminal court. 32
Due process rights granted to all adults in criminal court were routinely
withheld from children in the juvenile court. 33 Adversary truth-finding
and the resolution of factual issues were shunned as the judge, proba-
tion officer, parents, and child worked together toward the minor's re-
habilitation." Dispositional options were discretionary and treatment
lasted for indeterminate years until a child either reached the age of
majority or was deemed to no longer be a child at risk. 35
Early juvenile court proceedings were closed to the public in or-
der to protect the identity of children and their families. 36 initially
reformers believed that the hearings should be open to the public to
ensure that the court activities and the disposition of cases were con-
sistent with community standards. 37 By 1952, however, most states ex-
cluded the general public from the hearings. 38 This exclusion was mo-
tivated by the belief that private hearings would shield the children
from any public humiliation and stigmatization that might otherwise
hamper rehabilitation. 39
Despite the noble intentions of those involved in the early
movement to create a distinct juvenile court geared toward rehabilita-
tion, the informality and private nature of the proceedings resulted in
little public oversight and led to arbitrary dispositions with indeter-
minate and punitive sentences.40 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, as
increasing numbers of children were institutionalized under the guise
of treatment, advocates for children in the juvenile justice system be-
gan to question whether the juvenile court was succeeding in its mis-
sion to rehabilitate youth. 41
32 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16 (noting that the ideas of crime and punishment were
abandoned and the focus was on rehabilitation and not punishment); jonN G. WATKINS,
JR., THE JUVENILE JUSTICE CENTURY: A SOCIOLOGICAL CoMhtENTARY °1st AMERICAN JUVE-
NILE CoutErs 47 (1998).
33 SNYDER & SIGKMUND, supra note 25, at 96.
34 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15 (noting that the early reformers who established the juve-
nile court were not concerned with guilt or innocence, but rather with the best interest of
the child); WATKINS, supra note 32, at 142.
SS SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 96.
vu David S. Tanenhaus, The Evolution offuvenile Courts in Me Early Twentieth Century: Be-
yond the Myth of Immaculate Construction, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE JusTicE 42, 61 (Marga-
ret K. Rosensheim et al. eds., 2002).
32 SNYDER & SICKNIUND, supra note 25, at 108.
"
Tanenhans, supra note 36, at 61.
40 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-19; Feld, supra note 10, at 1140.
41 See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 911,
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B. The Extension of Procedural Due Process to the Juvenile Court
hi the 1960s, advocates who feared that children were facing a sig-
nificant loss of personal liberty without being afforded basic constitu-
tional protections began to challenge the conventional bargain in the
juvenile court whereby children exchanged formal procedure for
treatment. 4u In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court in Kent v. United States,
the first of several cases that would bring increased procedural due
process to the juvenile court, held that an opportunity for hearing and
appointment of counsel must be afforded to juveniles facing the possi-
bility of transfer into adult court, that counsel must be granted access to
all relevant records, and that the judge's decision to transfer should he
memorialized in a written statement that would allow for meaningful
review." The Court noted that the reality of the juvenile court was such
that "the child received the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither
the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenera-
tive treatment postulated for children."'" Although still preserving the
juvenile court's goal of rehabilitation and designation as a civil court,
the Court recognized that juveniles should be afforded some of the ba-
sic procedural due process protections characteristic of the adult crimi-
nal court because they faced a potential loss of liberty."
Although the Court's holding in Kent was narrowly limited only to
those juveniles facing transfer into the adult criminal court, the Court
suggested in dicta that due process rights should be granted to juve-
niles in all delinquency proceedings." The opportunity to extend clue
process rights to all children arose in 1967, in In re Gault, where the
Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
required that a juvenile in a delinquency adjudication proceeding be
given notice of the charges against him, 47 a right to counsel," and the
42 See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
545 (1971) (plurality opinion); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970); Gault, 387 U.S. at
33, 41, 55, 57; Kent, 383 U.S, at 561. The Court elaborated on this bargain in Gault, noting
that the guiding wisdom prior to the imposition of due process requirements was that the
disadvantages to the juveniles resulting from a lack or due process were more than offset
by the benefits of treatment and rehabilitation available only in the juvenile court. 387
U.S. at 21.
43 See 383 U.S. at 561.
44 Id. at 556.
43 Breed, 421 U.S. at 541; Winship, 397 U.S. at 367; Gault, 387 U.S. at 33, 41, 55, 57; Kent,
383 U.S. at 554.
43 383 U.S. at 555-56,
47 387 U.S. at 33.
46 Id. at 41.
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right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. 49 Further, under the
Fifth Amendment, the juvenile must be granted the privilege against
self-incrimination.5° The Court's holding affirmed that some due proc-
ess guarantees could no longer be withheld from juveniles under the
guise of offering juveniles rehabilitation instead of punishment. 51
The Court declared that these basic clue process requirements
would not destroy the uniqueness of the juvenile court. 52 The Court
stated that there was no place for procedural arbitrariness where the
consequence for the juvenile was a potential loss of liberty." Juveniles,
therefore, must be afforded some procedural regularity in delinquency
proceedings." Still, the Court narrowly limited its holding to only the
adjudicatory phase of the juvenile court proceeding. 55 The Court be-
lieved that the possible loss of liberty through commitment to a state
. institution at this phase warranted enhanced procedural formality that
was not necessary in the pre-judicial or post-adjudicative phases.°
Further, the Court explicitly stated that not all due process protec-
tions available to adults in criminal court should be extended to juve-
niles. 57 The standard by which it would be determined if due process
would be applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings was one of
fundamental fairness. 5° The granting of procedural rights was neces-
sary only to guarantee that the adjudicatory hearing was marked by clue
process and fair treatment. 59
In 1970, in In re Winship, the Supreme Court held that fundamen-
tal fairness required a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency 'proceeding.° Before address-
ing whether such a standard was required in the juvenile court, the
Court explicitly held that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt was required by the Due Process Clause for adults in criminal
court. 61 The Court stated that this standard of proof was warranted to
protect innocent adults against wrongful prosecution and noted that
49 Id. at 57.
59 Id. at 55.
m See id. at 27-28.
52 Gauli, 387 U.S. at 27.
" See id. at 30-31 (citing Kent, 383 U.S. at 554, 555).
54 Id. at 27-28.
55 Id. at 13.
55 Id.
57 Gault, 387 U.S. at 30-31.
58 See id. at 30.
59 Id.
397 U.S. at 368.
61 Id. at 364.
20081
	
The Interchange offuvenile Adjudications & Criminal Convictions 	 503
there was no reason not to similarly protect children. 62 The Court
stated that a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would not
undermine the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile court because such
a standard would not affect the confidentiality, formality, flexibility, or
speed of the proceedings. 65 Further, a beyond a reasonable doubt stan-
dard would not hamper the opportunity to consider the child's social
history or establish an individualized treatment plan during the post-
adjudicatory phase of the proceeding."
C. McKeiver v, Pennsylvania: No Constitutional Right to a Jury Trial
The Supreme Court's extension of due process rights to juveniles
was not without limitation. 65 In 1971, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the
Supreme Court held by plurality opinion that juveniles do not have a
constitutional right to a jury trial in the adjudicative phase of a delin-
quency proceeding. 66 The plurality noted that the historical application
of the fundamental fairness due process standard focused on fact-
finding procedures, and because juries are not more capable in making
factual determinations than judges, the jury is not a necessary compo-
nent to accurate factfinding. 67 The plurality feared that requiring a jury
trial in juvenile delinquency proceedings would turn the proceedings
into adversary processes, effectively ending the informal, private, and
nonpunitive nature of juvenile delinquency proceedings. 68 The plural-
ity cited the petitioners' arguments equating the adjudicative phase of
the juvenile delinquency proceeding with the adult criminal trial as
cause for concern.69 The Court noted that although the juvenile court
had not been categorically successful in realizing its goal of rehabilita-
tion, the states should be allowed to continue identifying ways to reha-
bilitate, rather than punish, juvenile offenders."
Although juveniles do not have a right to jury trial under the U.S.
Constitution," some states give juveniles a state statutory or constitu-
62 Id. at 365.
63 Id. at 366.
64 Id. at 366-67.
65 See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 545 (plurality opinion).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 543, 547.
68 Id. at 545.
66 Id. at 550.
76 McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547 (plurality opinion).
71 Id. at 545.
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tional right to jury trial in all proceedings. 72 Other states allow for a
jury trial in limited, offense-specific circumstances."
II. THE JUVENILE COURT TODAY
A child facing adjudication in juvenile court today has the rights to
notice of the charges against him or her, 74 the assistance of counsel,"
and confrontation of witnesses. 76 Further, he or she has the privilege
against self-incrimination. 77 The act of delinquency must be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt," but there is no constitutional right to trial
by jury." Although these fundamental due process rights cannot be
eviscerated by state legislatures, the jurisdiction and purpose of the
court is at the mercy of legislative will and can be changed to address
problematic social issues." In response to concerns about increases in
the rates of youth violence and a toothless rehabilitation system, legisla-
tures have amended state statutes to make the juvenile court more pu-
nitive. 81 Such changes include limiting the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court by providing for mandatory waiver into adult court, diluting the
respect for privacy historically given to children in the juvenile court,
and shilling the goal of disposition from one of rehabilitation to one of '
punishment. 82 Between 1992 and 1997, state laws in forty-five states
made it easier to transfer juveniles into the adult system, thirty-one
states increased the sentencing options for juveniles, and forty-seven
states removed juvenile court confidentiality protections, resulting in
more public proceedings and greater access to juvenile records." Fur-
ther, although in most states the juvenile court has original jurisdiction
72 E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 55A (2006); Thx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03(b) (6)
(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2007).
"	 C01.0. REV. STAT. § 19-2-107(1) to -107(2) (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-1656
(2000); W. W. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6(a) (LexisNexis 2004 & Stipp. 2007) (allowing juveniles
a jury trial for any delinquency where there is a possibility of incarceration).
74 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
75 Id. at 41.
76 Id. at 57.
77 Id. at 55.
78 In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).
79 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion).
80 See WATKINs, supra note 32, at 88.
81 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 96-97 (noting that many state legislatures
have made it easier to transfer juvenile offenders into the adult criminal justice system,
sentencing options have been increased and expanded to include punitive aspects, and
confidentiality laws have been relaxed).
82 Id.
83 Id.
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for all persons under the age of eighteen, in sonic states the juvenile
court jurisdiction ends at ages fifteen or sixteen; juveniles in these
states have not yet reached the age of majority but are categorically
considered adults for the purpose of assessing criminal responsibility."
A. Transfer into Adult Court
The U.S. Supreme Court has explicitly maintained that rehabilita-
tion is a legitimate goal of the juvenile court and delinquency adjudica-
tions are not criminal convictions. 85 From the earliest days of the juve-
nile court, however, judges have recognized that some children should
not be afforded the protections of a nonpunitive, rehabilitative court
and have transferred them to criminal court. 88 The Supreme Court es-
tablished the minimum procedural due process necessary in a juvenile
court transfer proceeding in 1966, in Kent v. United States, holding that
an opportunity for hearing and appointment of counsel must be af-
forded to juveniles facing the possibility of transfer, that counsel must
be granted access to all relevant records, and that the judge's decision
should be memorialized in a written statement that would allow for
meaningful review. 87
A system of judicial waiver allowed for discretion in the transfer of
a juvenile into adult court when a judge determined that the child was
not amenable to treatment or was a danger to society. 88 This system was
viewed as consistent with the goal of the juvenile court because the fo-
cus remained on the offender and not the offense; the decision to
waive a juvenile into adult court thus reflected an individualized, of-
" Id, at 103.
85 See Winship, 397 U.S. at 366 (noting that affording juveniles the protection of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt would not risk destruction of the beneficial aspects of juvenile
court and would not disturb policies that delinquency adjudication recognizing a violation
of criminal law are not equivalent to criminal convictions); see also McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547
(plurality opinion) (stating that the Court is reluctant to say that juvenile court is not ca-
pable of accomplishing the rehabilitation of juveniles); id. at 551-52 (White, J., concur-
ring) (noting that juveniles are presumptively neither mature nor malevolent in their choices
and actions and so state legislatures are reluctant to deem them to he criminals); Gault,
387 U.S. at 22-23 (noting that the availability of some due process rights should not un-
dermine the unique rehabilitative nature of the juvenile court or result in juveniles being
deemed criminals).
BB WATKINS, supra note 32, at 89.
B7 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,561 (1966).
" Feld, supra note 10, at 1215.
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fender-oriented sentencing decision. 89 As the Supreme Court noted in
1975, in Breed v. jaws, which held that jeopardy attached to delinquency
adjudications in juvenile court, transfer allows flexibility for the court
system to deal with juvenile offenders who cannot benefit from the re-
habilitation and treatment offered in the juvenile court. 99
Today, transfer to adult court continues to provide a means to pun-
ish those juveniles deemed ill-suited for the juvenile court—usually vio-
lent offenders, chronic offenders, or both. 91
1. Methods of Transfer into Criminal Court
Traditionally, judicial waiver was the sole method of determining
if a juvenile should be transferred into adult court because he or she
was no longer amenable to treatment. 92 In many jurisdictions, how-
ever, legislatures have created alternatives or supplements to pure ju-
dicial waiver. 93 Transfer statutes make it easier to remove juveniles
from juvenile court for trial in the criminal court."
Beginning in the 1970s, legislatures enacted statutes that moved
away from the individualized determinations made in judicial waiver in
favor of statutorily required removal of juveniles to adult criminal court
based on the age of the child, the seriousness of the offense, or some
combination of both, without any consideration of the juvenile's ame-
nability to treatment.95 As a result of this legislative shift, there are now
three general methods of transfer: 1) judicial waiver (also known as
"certification," "remand," or "transfer"), 2) concurrent jurisdiction (also
known as "legislative waiver," "prosecutorial discretion," or "direct file,"),
and 3) statutory exclusion (also known as "legislative exclusion"). 96
In a jurisdiction that maintains traditional judicial waiver, the
judge has the authority to transfer the juvenile into adult court after
determining that the child is not amenable to treatment due to his or
89 Barry C. Feld, Legislative Exclusion of Offenses from Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: A History
and Critique, in THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 83, 87 ( Jeffrey Fagan &
Franklin 'inuring eds., 2000).
90 Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 535 (1975).
91 1)01111a Bishop & Charles Frazier, Consequences of Waiver, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 89, at 227, 227.
92 Robert 0. Dawson, Judicial Waiver in Theory and Practice, in THE CHANGING BORDERS
or JUVENILE JusTicE, supra note 89, at 45, 45.
95 Id.
94 See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 96.
95 See id. at 113.
98 See id. at 110.
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her nature or the seriousness of the crime. 97 The standard of whether
the juvenile is "amenable to treatment" involves consideration of such
factors as the juvenile's offense history and previous dispositions, the
availability of dispositional alternatives, the time available for sanc-
tions, the threat to public safety, and the best interests of the child. 98
Judicial waiver remains the most common transfer provision but it is
often supplemented by statutory exclusion for certain offenses, limit-
ing the extent to which judges have complete discretion in determin-
ing a juvenile's amenability to treatment. 99 Judicial waiver into adult
court . is constitutionally valid only where there is a transfer hearing,
the juvenile is afforded the right to counsel, counsel has complete
access to all records that the court may consider in making the waiver
decision, and the judge makes a written statement as to the reasons for
waiver.th° Although some states still allow for pure judicial discretion,
many state statutes create a rebuttable presumption in favor of waiver
or mandatory waiver if a judge finds that certain statutory criteria have
been met. 10 t
In a state with a system of concurrent jurisdiction, original jurisdic-
tion for specific offenses or over juveniles of a certain age (defined by
statute) is shared by both the juvenile and adult criminal courts, and
the prosecutor has discretion to file in either court. 1 °2 In a jurisdiction
with statutory exclusion, statutes mandate that juveniles accused of cer-
tain offenses (such as rape or murder) cannot be adjudicated in the
juvenile court, and so they are automatically charged in the criminal
court.ws
97 Id.; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-327(C) to -327(D) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 985.556(4) (c) (West 2007); 1lAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-22(c) (LexisNexis 2005); 42 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6355(a) (West 2000).
98 See Kent, 383 U.S. app. at 566-68. The Supreme Court appended a Policy Memoran-
dum to their opinion in Kent, suggesting the following factors be considered by a judge
where he or she has discretion to waive a juvenile to adult court: 1) the seriousness of the
offense; 2) the level of aggression, violence, or premeditation in the offense; 3) whether
personal injury resulted from the offense; 4) the merit of the complaint; 5) whether the
juvenile has adult codefendants; 6) the maturity and sophistication of the juvenile, given
his home situation; 7) the juvenile's delinquency record; and 8) the likelihood of reason-
able rehabilitation. Id.
r See Feld, supra note 89, at 84-85.
100 Kent, 383 U.S. at 557.
101 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 112.
102 Id. at 110; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-501(B) (2001 & Stipp. 2006); FLA,
STAT. ANN. § 985.556(1); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 857 (2004).
" SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 110; see, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
501 (A); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.556(3); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-30-1-4 (LexisNexis 2003 & Supp.
2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS C11. 119, § 74 (2006).
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Judicial waiver, concurrent jurisdiction, statutory exclusion, or
some combination of-all three, is provided for by statute in every
state,'" Additionally, some states allow "reverse waiver," whereby judges
sitting in the criminal court can transfer waived juveniles back to the
juvenile court for adjudication. 105 Further, some states allow blended
sentencing where the juvenile court has the authority to impose adult
criminal sanctions to compliment the juvenile disposition or the adult
court has the authority to impose some rehabilitative dispositions
(which are generally available only in the juvenile court) to criminal
sentences.'"
2. Transfer into Criminal Court and Heightened Procedure
Where there is judicial waiver, the transfer hearing must occur
prior to the adjudicatory hearing.107 Under the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a child adjudicated delinquent in ju-
venile court cannot subsequently be transferred to adult court for dis-
position. 1" Jeopardy attaches to a juvenile adjudicatory proceeding
once the evidence is presented to the trier of fact.'"
The decision to transfer a child from juvenile court to adult crimi-
nal court has significant consequences for the child, including expo-
sure to an adult criminal sentence. 110 Additionally, in the majority of
states, once a juvenile has been transferred and convicted in adult
court, he or she is considered an adult for any subsequent offense."
Due to the consequences of transfer, waived juveniles receive all of the
procedural due process rights afforded to adults in the criminal court,
including a right to trial by jury. 112
104 See supra notes 32, 102, 103 and accompanying text.
100 	 & SICKMUND, Sttpra note 25, at 110; see, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§6322(e) (West 2000).
I " SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 110; see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 119, § 58
(stating that a child determined to be a youthful offender can be sentenced to a combina-
tion sentence consisting of commitment to the Department of Youth Services until age
twenty-one followed by an adult sentence in the Department of Corrections).
1117 Breed, 421 U.S. at 536.
1 " Id. at 541.
109 Id. at 532.
1'0 See id. at 535.
111 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 110; see, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-
22 (e) (LexisNexis 2005).
112 SeelATATKtNs, supra note 32, at 151.
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B. Use of Delinquency Adjudications in Criminal Court
In addition to making the transfer of children from juvenile to
criminal court procedurally less burdensome, state legislatures have al-
tered the juvenile court by increasing judicial access to juvenile records
for consideration in sentencing in subsequent adult proceedings." 3
1. Historical Use of juvenile Records by Criminal Courts
Consistent with the goal of rehabilitation and the nonpunitive na-
ture of the juvenile court, children with delinquency adjudications his-
torically entered adulthood with a clean slate)" In the earliest years of
the juvenile court, adult criminals who had delinquency records were
not treated as recidivists in their sentencing; although the judge might
have known that the person had a juvenile record, he or she could not
use that information to treat a first-time adult criminal as a repeat of-
fender." 5
The initial reluctance on the part of the adult court to use delin-
quency adjudications as evidence of recidivism stemmed from con-
cerns about adequate facdinding in the juvenile court, but the grant-
ing of due process rights to ensure fair adjudication hearings lessened
this concern. 116 Nevertheless, even where adult criminal court judges
had access to juvenile records, delinquency adjudications were rarely
viewed as equivalent to criminal convictions. 117 Increasingly, however,
allowing adult criminal courts access to juvenile delinquency records
is justified by the argument that society has a reasonable interest in
identifying and punishing recidivist offenders." 8
2. Use of Delinquency Adjudications as Criminal Convictions in the
Late Twentieth Century
Since the 1980s, legislatures across the country amended or cre-
ated sentencing guidelines to mandate that delinquency adjudications
113 SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 108-09.
114 Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class Punishment: The Use of Juvenile
Records in Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206,207 (1998).
116 Id.
116 Id. at 208.
117 Id.
11I3	 see Feld, supra note 10, at 1182-85 ("A rational sentencing policy should identify
criminally active young offenders for selective incapacitation or greater punishment, and a
prior record of persistent offending, whether acquired as a juvenile or as an adult, pro-
vides the best evidence of career criminality.").
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put first-time adult criminal offenders in recidivist status. 119 As of 1998,
juvenile court statutes in forty-five states contained provisions that al-
lowed disclosure of at least some juvenile court records (generally those
for felony adjudications) for sentencing purposes following a criminal
conviction. 129 The impact that a juvenile adjudication may have on sen-
tence enhancement varies across jurisdictions. 121 Although some states
allow a minimal increase in sentencing time, other states' sentencing
guidelines, as well as certain provisions of the U.S. Sentencing Guide-
lines, consider adjudications for certain offenses to be equal to adult
crimes in a criminal history score. 122 For example, in California, some
juvenile delinquency adjudications constitute "strikes" under the Cali-
fornia 'Three-Strikes" law. 123 Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines,
juvenile adjudications and adult convictions that result in at least sixty
days of confinement are equal in the number of points that they add to
an adult's criminal history score. 124
Courts have consistently upheld the statutorily sanctioned use of
juvenile delinquency adjudications as factors to be considered in de-
termining the sentence of an adult. 125 In 1994, in United States v. John-
L 19 Sanborn, supra note 114, at 208.
120 Id. at 209.
121 Id
122 See Feld, supra note 10, at 1187.
123 CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (West 1999). This is an exception to the general rule
that delinquency' adjudications should not be considered convictions under California law.
CAL.. WELF. & INST. CODE § 203 (West 1998). Section 667 says that a juvenile delinquency
adjudication can be used as a prior conviction for enhancement purposes tinder Three
Strikes when: (A) the juvenile was sixteen or older when the prior offense was committed;
(B) the prior offense otherwise qualified under section 707(6), as a violent felony under
section 667.5, or as a serious felony under section 1192.7; (C) the juvenile had been found
to be a lit and proper subject for the juvenile court; and (D) the juvenile has been ad-
judged a ward of the court. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d) (3). In 2007, in People v Nguyen, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth District of California held that a juvenile adjudication is not
a prior conviction under Apprende where there is no right to trial by jury and therefore that
an adjudication by a judge cannot be used to enhance an adult sentence beyond the statu-
tory maximum under the Three Strikes Law. 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 255, 281 (Ct. App. 2007),
milk granted, People v. Nguyen, 169 P.3d 882, 882 (Cal. 2007). It should be noted that
Nguyen is only the most recent decision in California and a petition for review has been
granted. Nguyen, 1439 P.3d at 882. Further other California District Courts of Appeals have
concluded that nonjury delinquency adjudications can be used as convictions under the
California Three Strikes Law. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 901, 904 (Ct. App.
2003); People v. Bowden, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 518 (Ct. App. 2002).
124 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (b), 4A1.2(d) (2) (2007).
123 See United States v. Davis, 48 F.3d 277, 280 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson,
28 F.3{1 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. McDonald, 991 F.2d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir.
1993); United States v. Mackbee, 894 F.2d 1057, 1058 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wil-
liams, 891 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989).
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son, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ex-
pressed support for punishing recidivist offenders, noting that the re-
habilitative rationale of the juvenile court disappears when one who has
been adjudicated delinquent in the past becomes an adult criminal,
because the person has proven that he or she cannot be deterred by
serving a minimum of sixty days in a prison-like facility. 126 In 1995, in
United States v. Davis, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
noted that it considered it imperative that a defendant's sentence re-
flect his or her entire criminal history, including juvenile delinquency
adjudications. 127 The court stated that the transgressions of a juvenile,
when considered in light of his or her subsequent adult offense, helped
the judge determine whether the defendant was a criminal recidivist. 128
In Davis, the court noted that ultimately the judge had within his dis-
cretion the ability to disregard the juvenile record. 129
3. Apprendi v. New, jersey and the Subsequent Circuit Split
In 2000, in - Apprendi v. New jersey, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
"other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 13° The
precise issue before the Court in Apprendi was whether due process re-
quired that a factual determination that petitioner Charles Apprendi
committed a hate crime could be made by the judge or whether it must
be offered to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt because
such a finding would increase his sentence beyond the statutory maxi-
mum sentencing range. 131
The Court exempted any "fact of prior conviction" because the
defendant was presumptively afforded due process in the trial that
culminated in the conviction, therefore making it accurate and reli-
able.' 32 The Court specifically noted that prior convictions are valid in
part because of the defendant's right to jury trial and the prosecutor's
126 28 F.3d at 155; see also Williams, 891 F.2d at 215 (rejecting petitioner's claim that the
use of his .nonjury delinquency adjudication in calculating his criminal score under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines violated due process because petitioner had all the clue proc-
ess to which he was constitutionally entitled).
127 48 F.3d at 280.
128 Id,
129 Id.
1 q 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
131 Id. at 469.
192 See id. at 496.
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burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)" This reasoning
has resulted in a circuit split as to whether juvenile delinquency adjudi-
cations can properly be considered "prior convictions" in enhancing
adult criminal sentences under Apprendi because juveniles do not have
a constitutional right to jury trial. 134
In 2001, in United States v. Tighe, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the prior conviction exception to Apprendi's
general rule is limited to prior convictions that were obtained through
proceedings that included the right to a jury trial and a standard of
proof of beyond a reasonable doubt.'" In Tighe, petitioner Shannon
Tighe appealed his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act,
which mandated a minimum fifteen-year sentence for a person who
violates a felon-in-possession of a weapon statute and has three previous
convictions for either violent felonies or serious drug offenses, arguing
in part that it was improper for the district court to consider a prior
juvenile delinquency adjudication as a prior conviction under Ap-
133 Id. at 490. The Court's 1999 opinion in Jones v. United States, stating that under the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment, any fact other than a prior conviction that increases the maximum
penalty for a crime must he charged in an indictment and proven to a jiffy beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, foreshadowed its holding in Apprendi. Id. at 476; Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). In Jones, the Court distinguished prior convictions from other
factors, noting that prior convictions must have been established through procedures
which satisfied the guarantees of fair notice, reasonable doubt, and the jury trial. 526 U.S.
at 249.
199 Mt:Kehler, 403 U.S. at 545 (plurality opinion). Compare United States v. Tighe, 266
F.3d 1187, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the prior conviction exception under
Apprendi is narrow and limited to prior convictions that were obtained through proceed-
ings that included the procedural necessities of a jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt and therefore nonjury juvenile adjudications are not included under the excep-
tion), with United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that juvenile
adjudications where the juvenile has the right to notice, the right to counsel, the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and the right
to a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, satisfy the reliability requirements under
Apprendi, even where there is no right to trial by jury), United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d
1183, 1190 (1 Ith Cir. 2005) (holding that a prior nonjury delinquency adjudication can
properly be considered under the Armed Criminal Career Act), United States v. Jones, 332
F.3d 688, 696 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a prior nonjury juvenile adjudication can be
considered a valid prior conviction fur purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the
Armed Criminal Career Act as long as the juvenile was afforded all of the constitutionally
required procedural safeguards to which he was entitled), and United States v. Smalley, 294
F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Apprendi decision was not so narrow as
the Tighe court concluded and that the inclusion of a juvenile delinquency adjudication
with the Apprendi exception should turn not on whether there was a jury but instead on
whether the adjudication is "so reliable that due process is not offended").
133 266 F.3d at 1194.
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prendi. 136 Tighe argued that Apprendi required that the fact of his non-
jury juvenile adjudication be charged in an indictment and proven to
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'" In holding that the "fact of prior
conviction" exception was available only where there was the right to a
jury trial, the Ninth Circuit specifically noted that there were significant
constitutional differences between adult convictions and juvenile adju-
dications, including the denial of the right to jury trial for juveniles.' 38
Despite similar underlying facts, in 2002, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit rejected Tighe's narrow reading of Apprendi in
United States v. Smalley, holding that the standard for exempting juvenile
adjudications should not turn on the identity of the factfinder, but
rather on whether the juvenile adjudication is so reliable that due
process of law is not offended by its use as a conviction, 139 Like the peti-
tioner in Tighe, petitioner Anthony Smalley was subject to sentencing
enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act based in part on
his prior delinquency adjudications."° The court noted that the safe-
guards that exist in juvenile court, including a standard of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt, are sufficient to guarantee the accuracy re-
quired for an Apprendi exception."'
Similarly, in 2003, in United States v. Jones, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that juvenile delinquency adjudications
could be used as prior convictions if the juvenile was afforded all of the
procedural safeguards to which he was constitutionally entitled. 142 In
Jones, petitioner Lester Jones challenged his sentencing enhancement
under the Armed Criminal Career Act in part because his nonjury ju-
venile delinquency adjudications were qualified as prior convictions. 143
The court considered both Tighe and Smalley in ultimately reaching its
conclusion that Jones's adjudication was properly considered in calcu-
lating his criminal score.'"
In 2005, in United States v. Burge, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Third Circuit's approach in ./ones and
1$6 Id. at 1189; seeArined Criminal Career Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (1) (2000 & Sum. IV
2004). The Armed Criminal Career Act specifically provides that convictions include juve-
nile delinquency adjudications involving violent felonies. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2) (C).
137 Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1191.
136 Id. at 1192-93.
139 Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1032-33; see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194.
140 Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1031.
111 Id. at 1033.
142 332 F.3d at 696.
143 Id, at 689,690.
144 Id. at 696.
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held that juvenile delinquency adjudications could properly be con-
sidered convictions in calculating a person's criminal score under the
Armed Criminal Career Act. 145 The court specifically noted that most
courts had rejected the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Tighe and instead
found that consideration of delinquency adjudications was proper if
the juvenile had received all of the due process to which he was con-
stitutionally entitled. 146
In 2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in United
States v. Crowd!, similarly held that the use of juvenile adjudications in
sentencing enhancements under the Armed Criminal Career Act does
not violate due process where the juvenile was afforded all of the due
process to which he or she was constitutionally entitled at the adjudi-
catory phase of the delinquency proceeding. 147 The court noted that
the focus should be on the overall reliability of the adjudication and
not with a "bright-line rule" requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, fair notice, and a right to trial by jury in order for, an adjudica-
tion to qualify for the Apprendi exception. 148
The U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First and Seventh Circuits have
held that the use of a juvenile delinquency adjudication as a criminal
conviction is presumptively proper where there is a state right to jury
trial in juvenile court, without further addressing the broader question
of whether the adjudications at issue would be sufficiently reliable in
the absence of such a right. 149 In United States v. Wilburn, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the use of defendant's juvenile delinquency adjudica-
tion in calculating his criminal score under the Armed Criminal Career
Act. 15° The court recognized that there was a split among the circuits as
to the application of Apprendi to nonjury delinquency adjudications,
but noted that it need not take a position on the split because the de-
fendant had a right to jury trial at his delinquency adjudication under
Wisconsin law. 151 In 2007, in United States v. Matthews, the First Circuit
held that where the reliability of a juvenile adjudication is as sound as
that of a criminal conviction, the adjudication could be considered for
purposes of the Apprendi exception for prior convictions. 152 Because the
145 407 F.3(1 at 1190.
146 Id.
147 493 F.3d at 750.
"H Id.
149 United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3d 25, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v.
Wilburn, 473 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2007).
150 Witham, 473 F.3d at 746.
151 id.
192 Matthews, 498 F.3d at 35.
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defendant, however, had a right to trial by jury at his delinquency adju-
dication under Massachusetts law, the court held that it need not re-
solve whether a jury trial was mandated under Apprendi, noting that the
adjudication could be properly considered a conviction for Apprendi
purposes even under the Ninth Circuit's more restrictive holding in
Tighe. 153
In addition to the split among the circuits, state courts are also di-
vided on the issue of how to properly treat juvenile delinquency adjudi-
cations in sentencing enhancement. 154 The Ninth Circuit's decision in
Tighe—limiting the Apprendi exception for prior convictions to those
obtained through proceedings that included the right to a jury trial—
has been accepted by state courts in Indiana, Louisiana, and Tenncs-
see. 155 It has been rejected by state courts in Kansas, Minnesota, and
Washington, which have held that convictions properly include juvenile
delinquency adjudications for Apprendi purposes where the juvenile
received all of the due process to which he or she was constitutionally
entided. 156
III. THE MISGUIDED RESPONSE TO THE APPLICATION OF APPRENDI
The Supreme Court's 2000 holding, in Apprendi u New Jersey, and
the subsequent split among courts as to whether adjudications qualify
as convictions, has led to a renewed call for the right to trial by jury in
155 Id. at 35-36; Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194.
04 See infra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
155 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194-95; Pinkston v. State, 836 N.E.2d
453, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that a juvenile adjudication is not a criminal con-
viction, in part because there is no right to trial by jury, and so an adjudication cannot be
used for Apprendi purposes); State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1288 (La. 2004) (holding
that because juveniles do not have a right to a jury trial in juvenile delinquency proceed-
ings, delinquency adjudications cannot be uses to enhance adult felony convictions); State
v. Chatman, No. M2003-00806-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 901138, at *6 (Tenn. Crini. App. Oct.
24, 2005) (holding that juvenile adjudications do not qualify as criminal convictions tinder
Apprendi).
156 Apprentii, 530 U.S. at 490; State v. Hitt, 42.P.3d 732, 740 (Katt. 2002) (holding that
juvenile delinquency adjudications need not be proven to a jury before they can be in-
cluded in calculating a defendant's criminal history score); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d
607, 613, 615 (Minn. 2006) (holding that it is not inconsistent with the legislative intent
behind the juvenile justice system, which recognizes the need to promote accountability
among juveniles, to consider adjudications in calculating a defendant's criminal history
score); State v. Weber, 112 P.3d 1287, 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that delin-
quency adjudications that meet all of the constitutional safeguards to which juveniles are
constitutionally entitled are properly considered in the calculation of a criminal history
score, even where there is no right to jury trial).
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the juvenile court. 157 Specifically, there is a call to revisit the Supreme
Court's 1971 decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, where the Court held
that juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in the ad-
judicatory phase of a delinquency proceecling. 158 The underlying ra-
tionale for granting juveniles a right to trial by jury is that it would
make delinquency adjudications more reliable for use in a subsequent
adult sentencing enhancement. 159 The argument is that it is inconsis-
tent and unfair to deny juveniles a right to a jury trial precisely because
adjudications are not criminal proceedings but later use those adjudi-
cations as criminal convictions. 160
This call for revisiting McKeiver or otherwise granting juveniles a
statutory right to jury trial in a delinquency proceeding is powerful in
light of the Court's recent discussions of the role of the jury in the
criminal justice system. 161 In McKeiver, the Court reasoned that a jury
would not significantly strengthen factfinding in the juvenile court and
therefore was not a necessary part of a fair or equitable criminal proc-
157 See generally Feld, supra note 10.
138 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 595 (1971) (plurality opinion). Professor
Feld argues that McKeiver is ripe for overruling and that until McKeiver is overruled, states
should grant either a state constitutional or statutory right to a jury in the adjudicatory
phase of a delinquency proceeding in order to legitimatize the criminal courts' use of such
adjudications as "'acts of prior conviction." Feld, supra note 10, at 1116. Feld concedes that
it is sound policy to consider juvenile delinquency adjudications in adult sentencing en-
hancements and argues that because of this fact, the necessity for accurate factfinding at
adjudication is critical. See id. at 1194. The crux of Feld's arguments is that although it is
rational to use juvenile delinquency adjudications as factors in subsequent adult sentenc-
ing, it is an anomaly to use treatment-based dispositions for sentencing enhancements
when juveniles are denied some procedural safeguards, such as the right to trial by jury, at
adjudication. See id. at 1190. A constitutional or statutory right to a jury trial for juveniles
would mitigate unfairness in juvenile courts and the injustice that results when adjudica-
tions couched as treatment are used for extending adult sentences. See id. at 1224.
159 See Feld, supra note 10, at 1224.
160 See State v. Brown, 879 So. 24.1276, 1289 (La. 2004). In 2004, in State a Brown, the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana held that juvenile adjudications could not he considered predicate
offenses where the adjudication was obtained without the right to trial by jury. Id. at 1290.
The court rioted that it would be incongruous and illogical to use noncriminal adjudications
as criminal sentencing enhancers because, the right to jury was denied precisely because of
the noncriminal nature of the juvenile court. Id. at 1289; see also Pinkston v. State, 836 N.E.2d
453, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the procedural differences between juvenile and
criminal proceedings, specifically the lack of jury trial, make juvenile delinquency adjudica-
tions inappropriate for consideration as convictions); State v Chatman, No. M2003-00806-
CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 901138, at *6 (Tenn. Grim. App. Oct. 24, 2005) (noting that juvenile
delinquency adjudications are fundamentally different than criminal convictions and there-
fore it is inappropriate to consider them in sentence enhancement).
161 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 305-06 (2004); Ring v, Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002); Apprendi v. New jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 496 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999).
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ess. 162 Recent holdings indicate, however, that the Court does in fact
view the right to jury trial as essential to accurate factfinding and fair
process. t65
In 2002, in Ping v. Arizona, the Court held that an Arizona judge
could not sentence a defendant to death row based on his determina-
tion of the presence or absence of aggravating factors.' The Court
noted that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury would be dimin-
ished if the rule in Apprendi applied to noncapital defendants but not to
those who may be sentenced to death based on judicial factfinding. 165
The Court recognized that the guarantee of the jury trial was essential
to the administration of justice. 156 in 2004, in Blakely v. Washington, the
Court held that petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury was
violated when he was sentenced to ninety months (thirty-seven months
more than the standard maximum) based on a judicial finding that he
acted with deliberate cruelty. 167 The Court noted that petitioner Ralph
Blakely was entitled to a determination by a jury that he had acted with
deliberate cruelty, and explicitly stated that the right of jury trial is "no
mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in
our constitutional structure." 168 In 2005, in United States u Booker; the
Court affirmed Apprendi, noting that although the jury may impair ex-
pedient factfinding, the fairness and reliability protected by the right to
a jury trial outweigh any interest in speedy trials.' 69
Clearly the role of the jury as a factfinder is recognized as more
significant today than it was in McKeiverm This alone, however, does
not justify the decision to extend the right of jury trial to juveniles given
the significant consequences of doing so. 171 The extension of the right
to jury trial to the juvenile court will serve primarily to strengthen the
iss 403 U.S. at 547 (plurality opinion).
168 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305-06; Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; Ap-
prendi, 530 U.S. at 496; Jones, 526 U.S. at 249.
164 536 U.S. at 609.
16s hi.
166 See id (citing Duncan v, Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1968)).
167 542 U.S. at 300, 305.
168 Id. at 305-06.
Ns Booker, 543 U.S. at 244.
178 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305-06; Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; Ap-
prendi, 530 U.S. at 496; Jones, 526 U.S. at 249; McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547 (plurality opinion).
171 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496; United States v. Matthews, 498 F.3(1 25, 35-36 (1st Cir.
2007); United States v, Wilburn, 473 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tighe,
266 F.3d 1187, 1194 (9th Cir. 2001). Adjudications determined by juries are presumptively
proper for consideration as a conviction in a stibsequent adult sentence enhancement,
given their validity as accurate. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496; Matthews, 498 F.3c1 at 35-36;
'Wilburn, 473 F.3d at 746; Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194.
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legitimacy of using delinquency adjudications as convictions for the
purposes of enhanced sentencing in a subsequent adult criminal pro-
ceeding. 172 Such use 173 is improper, however, because, irrespective of
the factfinder, the juvenile court remains distinct from the criminal
court. 174
A. The Juvenile Court Is Not a Criminal Court
A delinquency adjudication should not be considered a conviction
for purposes of enhancing a subsequent adult sentence because the
juvenile court maintains rehabilitation as its goal and is not a criminal
court. 175 Calling for the recognition of a state or federal constitutional
or statutory right to a jury trial in juvenile court under the reasoning
that a delinquency adjudication could then be used as a conviction for
purposes of sentence enhancement improperly concedes that juvenile
delinquency adjudications are equivalent to criminal convictions. 176
Although the reality of the juvenile court is that it is increasingly
punitive,'" the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the
juvenile court is not a criminal court and rehabilitation remains an im-
portant goal. 178 Further, many state statutes explicitly state that the ju-
172 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496; Matthews, 498 F.3d at 35-36; Wilburn, 473 F.3d at 746;
Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194.
175 Apprendi specifically addressed the use of convictions as factors to enhance the sen-
tence of a defendant beyond the maximum authorized by statute, and not the proper use
within a sentencing range. 530 U.S. at 469. This Note argues, however, that any use, either
within a sentencing range or to extend it beyond the standard allowable maximum, is im-
proper.
174 See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263 (1984); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 529
(1970); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550 (plurality opinion); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1967).
175 Colleen P. Murphy, The Use of Prior Convictions After Apprendi, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv.
973, 1017 (2004).
176 See generally Feld, supra note 10. Feld consistently interchanges "conviction" and "ad-
judication," which ignores the significant constitutional differences between the two, See
Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1192-93.
177 See supra notes 74-156 and accompanying text.
171 See Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (noting that the state's parens patriae interest in protecting
the child makes juvenile proceedings fundamentally different than criminal proceedings);
Breed, 421 U.S. at 529 (noting that the fact that the juvenile court has not lived up to its
rehabilitative ideals in all cases should not detract from its goal); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547
(plurality opinion) (stating that the Court is reluctant to say that the juvenile court is inca-
pable of accomplishing its goal of rehabilitation); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 (1970)
(noting that affording juveniles the protections of proof beyond a reasonable doubt would
not disturb the policy that finding a child has violated a criminal law in a delinquency ad-
judication does not constitute a criminal conviction); Gault, 387 U.S. at 22-23 (noting that
the imposition of some procedural due process would not mean that juvenile court pro-
ceedings would be criminal proceedings).
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venile court's purpose is to rehabilitate and treat juveniles. 179 Indeed, it
is precisely because juvenile court proceedings are considered non-
criminal in nature that juveniles have historically not been granted the
full procedural due process to which they would be entitled in criminal
court)"
Legitimizing the use of delinquency adjudications as equivalent to
criminal convictions through the extension of the right to jury trial is
particularly troublesome because it is not clear that juveniles who have
a state statutory right to a jury trial exercise their right in a meaningful
way that allows them to benefit from the enhanced procedural safe-
guard. 181 Additionally, considering delinquency adjudications to be
in See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 53 (2006) (stating that delinquent children
should not be treated as criminals but rather as children in need of aid, encouragement, and
guidance); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260B.001 (West 2003) (explaining that the purposes of the
delinquency statute is to promote public safety and reduce juvenile delinquency through
means that are fair and just and recognize the unique needs of children and give them op-
portunities for growth); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-2l (h) (West 1997 & Stipp. 2006) (stating
that the act should be construed to effectuate the purpose of removing children from delin-
quent behavior and providing supervision, care, and rehabilitation and sonic sanctions to
promote accountability); IhrlS. STAT. ANN. § 938.01(2)(c) (West 2006) (explaining that in-
cluded among the purposes and intents of the juvenile justice act is equipping juvenile of-
fenders with the competencies necessary to live responsibly and productively).
California recognizes that punishment is a legitimate goal for the juvenile court that
can be balanced with rehabilitation.• CAL. WELT. & INST. CODE § 202(h) (West 1998 &
Stipp. 2007) (noting that juveniles in court because of delinquent conduct shall receive
care and treatment that is consistent with their best interests but also holding them appro-
priately accountable for their behavior). Further, even though the juvenile court is engag-
ing in punishment, an adjudication is not a criminal conviction. Id. § 203 (West 1998)
(stating that a juvenile adjudication should not be considered a criminal conviction and an
adjudication proceeding should not be considered a criminal proceeding).
McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550, 551 (plurality opinion); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 555 (1966).
181 See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH OF MASSAUVENILE COURT DEPARTMENT STATISTICS FISCAL
YEAR 2005, http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/juvenilecourt/2005stats .
html (last visited Feb. 4, 2008) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS STATISTICS]; TEX. APPLESEED
FAIR DEF. PROJECT ON INDIGENT DEF. PRACTICES IN TEX.—JUVENILE CHAPTER, SELLING
JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE IN TEXAS 14 (2000) [hereinafter'TEXAS RE-
PORT], available at hup://wwwnjdc.info/pdf/TexasAssess.pdf. There is evidence that most
juveniles, even where they have the right to trial by jury, plead delinquent. MASSACHU-
SETTS STATISTICS, Supra; TEXAS REPORT, SUpra, at 14.
Massachusetts specifically designates that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal.
Mass. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 53. However, juveniles are afforded a statutory right to a jury
trial in the adjudicatory phase of a delinquency proceeding. Id. § 55A. The juvenile court
statistics for Massachusetts are illustrative of the virtual non-use of the jury by juveniles; in
2005 there were 5066 jury-appropriate cases and only 82 jury trials. See Massatatusrms
STaTisTics, supra.
Similarly, Texas grants juveniles a right to a jury trial in the adjudicatory phase of a de-
linquency proceeding. TEX. FAst. CODE § 54.03(b) (6) (Vernon 2006). According to a 2000
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equivalent to criminal convictions bypasses and undermines the neces-
sity for state transfer statutes by which juveniles can be removed from
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and tried as adults.' 82
B. The Practical (In)Significance of the Right to Jury Dial in Juvenile Court
It is necessary to first ascertain whether juveniles and their attor-
neys consider a delinquency charge to be as significant as a criminal
charge before granting juveniles a right to jury trials.'" The right to trial
by jury in juvenile court will legitimize the use of delinquency adjudica-
tions as equivalent to convictions.'" Such use may be unfair, however,
even where there is a right to trial by jury, if there is evidence that juve-
niles do not have the same motive to defend fully and vigorously against
a delinquency charge as they would against a criminal charge.'"
1. The Prevalence of Pleas in juvenile Court
By most accounts, both in jurisdictions that extend to juveniles a
right to jury trial and those that do not, the majority of juveniles waive
the right to an adjudication proceeding and plead delinquent.'88 Cer-
report on the state of juvenile defense in Texas, it is estimated that juveniles pled delin-
quent in anywhere from ninety to ninety-nine percent of all adjudications (varying slightly
across counties), and more than seventy-five percent of delinquent pleas were entered into
at the juvenile's first court appearance. See TEXAS REPORT, supra, at 14.
182 See infra notes 211-221 and accompanying- text.
181 See infra notes 184-210 and accompanying text.
184 See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496; Matthews, 498 F.3d at 35-36; Wilburn, 473 F.3c1 at 746;
Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194.
1 '15 Gf Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 323 (1979), In 1979, in Paddane
Hosiery Co. v. Shure, the Supreme Court held that the use of a finding from a prior offensive
suit against defendants in a subsequent suit was not unfair where, in part, the defendants
had the incentive and motivation to fully and vigorously defend against the first claim. Id.
In the spirit of this holding, one could argue that it may be unfair to consider a delin-
quency adjudication to be a criminal conviction where the juvenile may have defended
more vigorously had he or she realized the delinquency adjudication could carry with it
the weight of criminal conviction. See id.
186 See KIM BROOKS & DARLENE [(AMINE, JusTicE CUT SHORT: AN ASSESSMENT OF Ac-
CESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 19, 31
(2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Ohio_Assessment.pcif (concluding that the
vast majority of Ohio cases resulted in plea bargains and noting that a survey of juvenile
defense attorneys revealed that many had not brought a case to trial in years); ELIZABETH
GLADDEN KEHOE & KIM BROOKS TANDY, INDIANA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL
AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 39 (2006), available at
http://www.njdc ,info/pdf/Indiana%20Assessment.pdf (estimating that in Indiana, in
2006, anywhere from just five to twenty percent of cases had full adjudicatory hearings);
PATRICIA PURITZ & CATHRYN CRAWFORD, FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUN-
SEL. AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 31 (2006), available
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tainly, a high percentage of adult defendants similarly plead guilty in
criminal court and a system of plea bargaining unquestionably benefits
our justice system and should be encouraged.'" It is arguable, however,
that the unique goal of the juvenile court raises questions not similarly
raised when an adult defendant pleads guilty to a crime.' 88
Where the goal of the court is rehabilitation, not punishment,
whether the state can meet its burden of proof may not be determina-
tive if it is believed that the juvenile would benefit from the services
he or she would have access to if adjudicated delinquent.' 89 Further,
the consequences of pleading delinquent to one delinquency charge
versus a lesser delinquency charge may not be seen as significant be-
cause generally the juvenile court's jurisdiction will end at the juve-
nile's eighteenth birthday, and therefore, juveniles may not be con-
cerned with the actual length of their sentence.' 90 There may also be
significant differences in bargaining power in plea negotiations for
juveniles and adults. 191 When an adult chooses to plead delinquent to
manslaughter instead of murder, he is likely making an informed
at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf (estimating that over ninety per-
cent of youths in Florida choose to waive their right to an adjudication hearing and plead
delinquent); PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., VIRGINIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL.
AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 32 (2002), available at
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Virginia%20Assessment.pdf  (estimating that the rate of pleas is
eighty-five to ninety percent in Virginia); TEXAS REPORT, supra note 181, at 14 (estimating
that, in Texas, anywhere from ninety to ninety-nine percent of all charged adjudications
result in pleas). Although these numbers provide a small sample of the fifty-one juvenile
court jurisdictions, the uniformity in the high frequency of plea bargaining is notable.
187 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,260-61 (1971) (noting that plea bargain-
ing is an essential component of criminal justice, which should be encouraged, and that
the benefits of plea bargaining include the prompt and effective disposition of criminal
cases).
199 See infra 189-195 and accompanying text.
1" See TEXAS REPORT, supra note 181, at 24 (noting that many attorneys were guided in
their decision to recommend a plea more by what services they believed the children needed
than by whether they believed the state could meet its burden of proof at adjudication).
190 See BROOKS & KAMINE, supra note 186, at 53. The assessment report on juvenile de-
fense in Ohio noted that many juveniles were not aware of what charges led to their com-
mitment because pleas resulted in charges being dropped or modified. See id. It is signifi-
cant that children would plead delinquent and not know to what charge they were actually
pleading delinquent; this fact may indicate that children do not attach much significance
to being found delinquent for any particular offense, since their maximum time commit-
ment is likely the same (not beyond their eighteenth birthday). See id.
191 See PURITZ & CRAWFORn, supra note 186, at 43 {noting that prosecutors may argue
that engaging in plea negotiation sends juveniles the wrong message). In a negotiated
• plea, the defendant may enter a guilty plea in exchange for a prosecutor's agreement to
not bring any additional charges, to drop other pending charges, to allow a plea to a lesser
charge, or to make specific sentencing recommendations. See LYNN S. IIRANHAM, THE LAW
AND POLICY OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS IN A NUTSHELL 15 (7th ed. 2005).
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choice between two distinct and determinate sentences. 192 In juvenile
court, however, a juvenile who pleads delinquent may face an inde-
terminate sentence of commitment until age eighteen, regardless of
the offense.I 93 Further, the juvenile's decision to plea may also be un-
duly influenced by his or her parents who may want a quick resolution
and fail to realize the possible repercussions of their child being ad-
judicated delinquent)" In addition, a juvenile's counsel, with whom
the juvenile likely has had very limited contact, may pressure him or
her to plead delinquent in order to receive services. 195
2. A Framework for Analysis
The unique nature of the juvenile court gives reason to question
whether juveniles vigorously defend against adjudications as they would
against criminal convictions.' 96 -Similar concerns about motivation and
incentive to vigorously defend or litigate arise in the offensive use of
collateral estoppe1. 197 In 1979, in Parklane Hosiery Co. u Shore, the Su-
preme Court held that using a finding against defendants from a prior
suit filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") of-
fensively against defendants in • a subsequent shareholders' derivative
suit was not unfair where the defendants had incentive and motivation
to fully and vigorously defend against the SEC claim. 198 The Court
noted that the offensive use of a prior judgment against a defendant in
a subsequent action may be unfair if the defendant faced the possibility
of only nominal damages in the first action because the defendant may
192 See. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 (noting that there is a certain linkage between a crime
and punishment for violation of that Crime and therefore a defendant ought to be able to
predict his or her punishment from the face of the indictment).
199 See littooxs & RANUNE, supra note 186, at 53; see also Feld, mina note 10, 1185-86
(writing that the ambiguous nature of delinquency adjudications can make it difficult for
criminal courts to ascertain kar what offense the juvenile court adjudicated a youth). It
may be difficult for a criminal court to determine the exact nature of the offense when
later considering enhancing a sentence beyond the statutory maximum. See id.
194 See PURITZ & CRAWFORD, supra note 186, at 28 (noting that parents were often
swayed by judges who told diem that the matter would be over today if their child pled
delinquent). In influencing their child's decision to plead delinquent, parents might not
realize the significant consequences that may result from the subsequent dispositional
hearing, where the imposition of a sentence to confinement might make the adjudication
eligible for consideration as a criminal conviction under sentencing guidelines. See U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (b), 4A1.2(d) (2) (2007).
195 See TEXAS REPORT, supra note 181, at 24.
196 See supra notes 189-195 and accompanying text.
197 See Parklane, 439 U.S. at 323.
198 Id.
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not have had as much incentive to defend against the claim, especially
if he did not foresee future litigation arising from the same issue.' 99
Clearly, the Court recognizes that the potential consequences
that one foresees resulting from his or her failure to defend are key
factors in the decision to defend against a charge and in choosing a
strategy.r Although making what was previously an "adjudication"
equivalent to a "conviction" for subsequent use in enhancing a crimi-
nal sentence is not quite the precise issue of relitigating a claim, the
spirit of the law is anaiogous. 201 When a juvenile is transferred and
tried in adult court, the consequences of criminal conviction are read-
ily apparent and warrant a vigorous defense, but for a child facing a
delinquency adjudication, the criminal consequences of his or her
adjudication may not be clear.202
A juvenile who pleads delinquent faces a potential loss of liberty
and the possibility that his or her adjudication will later be used as a
criminal conviction. 203 Indeed, the decision to plead delinquent, as
opposed to being adjudicated delinquent, may make it more likely
that the adjudication will later be used as a criminal conviction. 204
Therefore, it could be argued that the consequences, including the
potential loss of liberty, are apparent and provide juveniles with a suf-
" Id. at 330.
20° See id.
2° 1 Cf. id. Essentially, the argument is that a judge should not be able to turn a delin-
quency adjudication into a criminal conviction for purposes of sentencing in a subsequent
adult criminal proceeding, where the incentive to defend in the delinquency proceeding
may not have been as high because the juvenile clid not foresee that the adjudication
would be considered a criminal conviction. See id.
2°2 See People ex rel. Wayhurn v. Schupf, 350 N.E.2d 906, 909 (N.Y. 1976). The New
York Court of Appeals noted that pretrial detention of juveniles may be warranted, even
where it would not be for adults, because juveniles are more likely to commit crimes again
if released, in part because they lack the experience and comprehension to view criminal
acts in the same perspective as an adult. Id. The court noted that juveniles may not be de-
terred from committing a crime while awaiting adjudication because of the consequences
faced if they commit another crime—treatment as opposed to punishment. Id. Under this
reasoning, it could he argued that a juvenile likely does not foresee the criminal conse-
quences of an adjudicatory hearing. See id.
2°3 See. United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 750 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v.
surge, 407 F.3d 1183, 1190 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 696 (3d
Cir. 2003) United States v. Smalley. 294 F.3d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 2002); State v. Hitt, 42
P.3d 732, 740 (Kan. 2002); State v. McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 615 (Minn. 2006); State v. We-
ber, 112 P.3d 1287. 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
2°4 See Crowell, 493 F.3d at 749 (interpreting Apprendi to hold that "a fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt or the admitted by the defendant") (emphasis
added).
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ficient and compelling incentive to vigorously defend against a delin-
quency charge. 205 Indeed, it is in part because of the potential loss of
liberty at stake in an adjudication that the Supreme Court extended
procedural due process to the adjudicatory phase of the delinquency
proceeding. 206 This potential loss of liberty, however, may not be
enough to motivate a juvenile who does not foresee the criminal con-
sequences of detainment as relevant beyond his or her eighteenth
birthday. 207 Further, the fact that some courts have upheld the use of
delinquency adjudications as convictions will not necessarily provide
juveniles with notice to properly and vigorously defend against a de-
linquency charge because not all jurisdictions have addressed the is-
sue, and the rules that have been established offer little guidance as
to the likelihood of subsequent use, especially in light of the fact that
sentencing guidelines and statutes can be changed, and adjudications
may count as convictions for some offenses and not others. 208
If there is a chance that a juvenile may not have the incentive to
fully and vigorously defend against a delinquency adjudication, allow-
ing that adjudication to be reframed as a criminal conviction in order
to enhance a subsequent adult sentence beyond the statutory maxi-
mum raises significant questions of fairness. 2°9. If the stakes of a delin-
quency proceeding are fundamentally inconsistent with the stakes of a
criminal proceeding, and the result of that difference is a conscious
205 Cf. Parklane, 439 U.S. at 323.
206 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 27.
2° 7 See BROOKS & KAMINE, supra note 186, at 53; supra note 190.
208 COMPCl/FiOneS, 332 F.3d at 696, with United States v. Huggins, 467 F.3d 359, 361 (3d Cir.
2006). The Armed Criminal Career Act explicitly states that "conviction" includes juvenile
delinquency adjudications for violent felonies. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2)(C) (2000). The use of
adjudications as convictions under the Armed Criminal Career Act was upheld by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Jones. 332 F.3d at 696. In United States v. Huggins,
however, the Third Circuit held that an adjudication could not be used as a conviction under'
another federal statute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(h) (1) (B) (2000 & Stipp. III 2003), because, unlike
the Armed Criminal Career Act, Congress did not include a specific provision that a delin-
quency adjudication should be considered a criminal conviction. 467 F.3d at 361. The court
specifically noted that under Pennsylvania law art adjudication is not the same as an adult
conviction because there is not a right to trial by jury in the juvenile court. Id. at 361. The
court distinguished Jones on grounds of the statutory language of the Armed Criminal Career
Act, effectively making the intent behind the Apprendi exception irrelevant. See id. at 362.
Such technical distinctions offer little guidance to juveniles in their decision to plead delin-
quent. See id. at 361; Jones, 332 F.3d at 696; see also Matthews, 498 F.3d at 33 (noting that the
Armed Criminal Career Act did not convert all juvenile delinquency adjudications into
criminal convictions, but rather "narrowly extend[ed] the statute's reach to specific juvenile
conduct").
209 See Paddane, 439 U.S. at 323.
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decision not to vigorously defend against a charge of delinquency, ad-
judications should not be considered criminal convictions. 210
C. Undermining the System of Transfer
Equating juvenile delinquency adjudications with criminal con-
victions for the purpose of enhancing a subsequent adult sentence
beyond the statutory maximum is also problematic because doing so
bypasses and undermines state transfer statutes that expose juveniles
to the possibility of criminal conviction. 2 " Allowing delinquency ad-
judications to be considered equivalent to criminal convictions essen-
tially allows prosecutors and judges to avoid the burden of complying
with state transfer statutes or the procedural due process standard for
a judicial waiver hearing as determined by the Supreme Court in
1966, in Kent v. United States. 212 Such standards were based on the very
significant difference in consequences between being found guilty of
a crime and adjudicated delinquent, and so bypassing these standards
by an ex post facto determination that an adjudication of delinquency
is the equivalent of a criminal conviction raises issues of fairness.213
In Kent, the Supreme Court established the due process require-
ments that must be met before a juvenile is transferred into adult court
by means of judicial waiver, holding that an opportunity for hearing
and appointment of counsel must be afforded, that counsel must be
granted access to all relevant records, and that the judge's determina-
tion should be memorialized in a written statement that would allow for
meaningful review. 214 The Court noted that such procedural require-
ments were necessary given the significant difference in consequences
arising when a juvenile is found guilty in adult criminal court as op-
posed to when a juvenile is adjudicated delinquent in the juvenile
court.215 State legislatures have responded to the high burden for judi-
210 See id. at 330.
211 	 supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
212 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 561.
213 See id. 553-54.
214 See id. at 561.
215 See id. at 553-54. The Court noted that these consequences included indefinite in-
carceration with adults instead of a limited treatment-focused sentence in a juvenile facil-
ity, as well as exposure to the death penalty. See id. Following the 2005 decision of the Su-
preme Court in Roper u Simmons, however, juveniles, even when transferred to adult court
and found guilty of a crime, cannot be executed under the Eighth Amendment. See 543
U.S. 551, 578 (2005). Transferred juveniles still face the possibility of life imprisonment,
although it could be argued that the Eighth Amendment similarly prohibits sentencing
juvenile offenders to life without parole. See generally Hillary J. Massey, Note, Disposing of
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cial waiver in Kent by amending their statutes to provide for alternate
methods of transfer, including direct file and concurrent jurisdiction
for those juveniles deemed ill-suited for the juvenile court because of
their age or the nature of the charged offense, arguably with the inten-
tion of making it easier for juveniles to be transferred to, and tried in,
adult criminal court. 216
Still, judicial waiver is the most common transfer provision among
the states. 217 The same underlying concerns about the significant con-
sequences of exposure to criminal conviction that were recognized by
the Court in Kent exist when an adjudication is ex post facto deter-
mined to be a criminal conviction—namely, the now-adult faces the
possibility of a longer loss of liberty because of his or her juvenile de-
linquency adjudication.218 The determination as to the weight a delin-
quency adjudication will carry should, in the spirit of Kent, be clearly
defined before adjudication and not subject to a later reinterpretation
that can increase the now-adult defendant's confinement. 219
The existence of transfer is recognition of the fact that the juvenile
court remains unique in its purpose—it is not a criminal court—and
children in juvenile court should not face criminal convictions. 220 A
system or transfer as a means for society to expose some juveniles to
adult criminal conviction seems unnecessary if any delinquency adjudi-
cation can later be reframed as a criminal conviction and all juveniles,
therefore, technically face the possibility of criminal conviction . 221
D. Availability of the Infancy Defense
If' juvenile delinquency adjudications are to be considered as
equivalent to criminal convictions for purposes of enhanced sentencing
in a subsequent adult criminal proceeding, the infancy defense should
be available to juveniles in adjudicatory proceedings. 222 Prior to the es-
tablishment of a separate juvenile court, the availability of the common
law infancy defense created a rebuttable presumption that children
Children: The Eighth Amendment and Juvenile Life Without Parole After Roper, 47 B.C. L. REV.
1083 (2006).
216 See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 25, at 113.
217 See id. at 112.
2111 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 553-54; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1(b),
4A1.2(d) (2) (2007).
219 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 553-54.
229 See WATKINS, supra note 32, at 89.
221 See Bulge, 407 F.34 at 1190; Jones, 332 F.3d at 696; Smalley, 294 F.3d at 1033.
222 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (discussing the availability of the in-
fancy defense to juveniles prior to the establishment of a distinct juvenile court).
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under the age of fourteen were incapable of appreciating the moral
dimension of their behavior and so could not be deterred by the threat
of punishment. 225 Some courts continue to recognize the infancy de-
fense as available to juveniles under fourteen.224
In the majority of jurisdictions, however, the common law infancy
defense has been denied absent statutes that specifically allow for the
defense, under the rationale that because a delinquency adjudication is
not a criminal conviction, it is unnecessary to determine whether the
juvenile understood the moral implications of his or her actions. 225 The
denial of the infancy defense is also justified on grounds that recogni-
tion of the defense would frustrate the rehabilitative purpose of the
juvenile court because children in need of the state's therapeutic ser-
vices would be removed from the court's jurisdiction. 228
The rationale that juveniles should be denied the infancy defense
because adjudicatory proceedings are not criminal proceedings does
not withstand scrutiny if delinquency adjudications can later be con-
sidered equivalent to criminal convictions for some purposes. 227 The
fact that children face the possibility of criminal consequences upon .
being adjudicated delinquent fundamentally changes the rehabilita-
tive purpose that is used to justify the denial of the infancy defense in
the juvenile court. 228 It is fundamentally inconsistent to hold a child
criminally responsible for an action when he or she was denied the
infancy defense on the basis of there being no possible criminal pen-
alties for the action. 229
CONCLUSION
Juvenile delinquency adjudications are increasingly considered to
he the equivalent of criminal convictions for purposes of sentencing
enhancement in a subsequent adult proceeding. The response to such
223 See In re Tyvonne, 558 A.2d 661, 664 (Conn. 1989).
224 See In re Gladys, 464 P.2d 127, 132 (Cal. 1970).
225 See Tyvonne, 558 A.2d at 666 (holding that because the common law infancy defense
was created to protect children charged as criminals, it has no place in the juvenile court,
where children are not found guilty of crimes).
226 See id. (noting that the legislature could decide that the availability of the infancy
defense might interfere with the state's efforts to help children by excluding those chil-
dren most in need of guidance).
227 see id,
228 See id. at 665-66 (noting that there was no evidence presented leading to the con-
clusion that the rehabilitative objectives of the juvenile justice system arc contradicted in
practice).
229 See id. at 666.
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use has led to a renewed call for a constitutional or statutory right to
trial by jury in juvenile court adjudicatory proceedings so as to legiti-
mize the use of such adjudications. Such an extension concedes that it
is proper to equate juvenile delinquency adjudications with criminal
convictions. This concession is troubling and improper for several rea-
sons. First, the juvenile court remains distinct from the criminal court
in its purpose and procedure. Second, given the prevalence of pleas in
the juvenile court, there may be significant questions about fairness
and whether juveniles fully and vigorously defend against delinquency
charges to the same extent that they would against criminal charges.
Finally, a system in which delinquency adjudications can ex post facto
be considered criminal convictions undermines the necessity for a sys-
tem of transfer from juvenile to adult court. Although fairness dictates
that juvenile adjudications should not be considered convictions, if they
are consistently used as such, the infancy defense should be made avail-
able in the juvenile court.
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